ANONANON Explorer
Read-only data from a public Solana RPC. Everything shown here is public to anyone.
Highlighted fields leak: faucet amounts are public, and each input shows a ring of candidate outputs — one is real, the rest are decoys.
| block | tx | input rings (1 real, rest decoys) | outputs | fee | public amount |
|---|
40 users deposit into a pool and later withdraw the same amount. An adversary sees only deposit and withdrawal times and amounts.
Random guessing ≈ 2.5%. Unique amounts and quick withdrawals collapse privacy regardless of cryptography. Longer, random delays and fixed denominations reduce linkage but never to zero.
| Property | ANON (this prototype) | Zcash shielded |
|---|---|---|
| Amount confidentiality | Yes — Pedersen + range proofs, tested | Yes |
| Recipient privacy | Yes — stealth one-time keys, tested | Yes |
| Sender / input privacy | Partial — ring of up to 8 (decoys from ledger) | Yes — zk-SNARK membership |
| Anonymity set per spend | ≤ 8 outputs per input | Entire shielded pool |
| Network-level privacy | None | None by default |
| Production use, audits | None | Years in production, multiple audits |
Today ANON offers weaker privacy than Zcash shielded transactions and Monero (ring size 16, years of research on decoy selection). Cryptographic confidentiality (hiding amounts and parties inside a tx) is different from network anonymity (hiding who broadcast it) — neither replaces the other.
- Deposit/withdraw amounts — public boundaries leak exact values.
- Timing — short dwell time links entries to exits.
- Input/output counts — unusual shapes fingerprint wallets.
- Fees — non-uniform fees identify software.
- Network layer — IP address at broadcast time needs Tor or a mixnet.
- Small anonymity set — privacy depends on how many others use the pool.